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Abstract 
Two experiments evaluated the utility of reconstructing exclusion and inclusion 
responses which are used in the process dissociation procedure (Jacoby, 1991) from 
simultaneous subject responses about fame and recollective memory. In Experiment 1, 
subjects studied 60 nonfamous-names with full or divided attention. In Experiment 2, 
subjects studied both 60 nonfamous and 60 famous-names under the same attention 
conditions. Subjects were tested using either a) separate inclusion and exclusion 
judgements of fame as described in the process dissociation procedure or b) simultaneous 
judgements of fame and prior occurrence. In the simultaneous conditions, subjects 
responded using a forced-choice paradigm with four choices: A) famous and studied, B) 
not famous and studied, C) famous and not studied, or D) not famous and not studied. 
I 
Inclusion responses were constructed by summing across responses A, B and C, while 
exclusion responses were constructed using only response C. Comparisons were made 
between reconstructed and actual inclusion and exclusion responses and estimates of 
recollective and automatic memory for both test conditions. In addition, the use of 
simultaneous judgements provided means to directly calculate the relation between 
estimates of recollective and automatic memory. In both Experiment 1 and 2 the use of 
simultaneous judgements qualitatively replicated findings from separate judgements. For 
both test groups, it was found that relative to full attention, divided attention reduced 
estimates of recollective memory but had no effect on automatic memory performance. 
Experiment 1 found negative dependence between the factors of recollection and fame 
judgements in the simultaneous groups (attributed to a responses bias based on subjects’ 
vii 
knowledge that no famous names were included on the study list), while Experiment 2 




Traditionally, the study of memory has relied upon tests involving explicit recall 
and recognition (for a review see Craik, 1979). These tests require conscious 
recollection of specific prior events (Tulving, 1983). More recently, the study of memory 
has come to include the examination of knowledge of a prior occurrence that may occur 
without deliberate or conscious recollection (e.g,. Squire & Cohen, 1984; Schacter, 
1987; Graf & Schacter, i985; Jacoby, 1981; 1991). These researchers have presented 
evidence that memory is not a unitary or single process. Instead, memory for prior 
events can have an effect on later performance which is independent of conscious 
recollection of that event (see Richardson-Klavehn & Bjork, 1988, for a review). 
The present investigation examined procedures for classifying separate memory 
components using the process dissociation procedure described by Jacoby (1991). The 
process dissociation procedure was designed to circumvent limitations associated with 
the process of identifying separate memory components (i.e. recollective and automatic) 
by using separate or independent tasks. Instead, the process dissociation procedure used 
a single task with separate instructions, thus avoiding the assumption that there was a one 
to one mapping between each task and the respective memory source. Calculations in 
the process dissociation procedure however require two assumptions that are difficult to 
examine. Specifically, the process dissociation procedure assumes independence between 
the different sources of memory and it assumes that subjects are using the same response 
criteria in the separate instruction conditions. The present research provides a method 
9 
that potentially avoids both of these limitations associated with the process dissociation 
procedure by measuring judgements of two memory components within a single task, 
using simultaneous judgements of two dependent variables. 
Literature Review 
Sources of Dissociations 
The retrieval of an item in standard memory tests such as cued recall, free recall, 
or recognition consists of a conscious attempt by subjects to retrieve previously studied 
items (Richardson-Klavehn & Bjork, 1988). In contrast, the retrieval of memory in 
priming tasks such as word stem completion or word fragment completion tasks (e.g., 
Jacoby & Dallas, 1981; Tulving, Schacter & Stark, 1982) do not make such an 
assumption because subjects are not required to retrieve a specific prior episode 
(Richardson-Klavehn & Bjork, 1988). That is, the retrieval of an item in standard 
memory tests and the retrieval of that same item in a priming or indirect test can be said 
to reflect two distinct forms of memory (Graf & Schacter, 1987). Moreover, 
dissociations observed between these two distinct forms of memory led to dichotomous 
classifications of memory processes. These include implicit and explicit (Schacter, 1987; 
Graf & Schacter, 1985); semantic and episodic (Tulving, 1983); familiarity and 
contextual (Mandler, 1980); unconscious and conscious (Jacoby, Kelley & Dywan, 1989; 
Jacoby & Kelley, 1992), recollective and automatic (Jacoby, 1991; Jacoby, Toth & 
Yonelinas, 1993; Jennings & Jacoby, 1993); procedural and declarative (Squire & Cohen, 
1984) and a ternary classification by Tulving (1985) with procedural, semantic and 
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episodic distinctions of memory. Evidence supporting these classifications suggests that 
memory is not a unitary or single process. 
Schacter (1987; Graf & Schacter, 1985) used the terms implicit and explicit 
memory to characterize the dissociations observed between different tests of memory. 
Schacter (1987) defined explicit memory as the conscious recollection of a past 
occurrence, and implicit memory as the passive consequence of stimulation revealed by 
facilitation of previous experiences on a task that does not require conscious or 
intentional recollection of those experiences. Explicit and implicit memory have been 
observed to be affected differently by several experimental variables. Implicit memory 
has been found to be sensitive to the surface features of stimuli such as modality 
(Hayman & Rickards, 1995; Jacoby, Toth & Yonelinas, 1993) while explicit memory is 
sensitive to a range of variables including attention (Jacoby, Toth & Yonelinas, 1993; 
Jennings & Jacoby, 1993; Debner & Jacoby, 1994), level of processing (Jacoby & Dallas, 
1981) and retention interval (Tulving, Schacter & Stark, 1982). 
In much of the research on implicit and explicit memory it was assumed that 
specific tests provided measures of specific types of memory (see Richardson-Klavehn & 
Bjork, 1998 for a review). Performance on an indirect test of memory such as a word 
stem or fi-agment-completion task (e.g, Jacoby & Dallas, 1981; Tulving, Schacter & 
Stark, 1982) was assumed to reflect implicit memory for a past event, whereas tests such 
as firee recall, cued recall or recognition provided measures of explicit memory for a past 
event (Graf & Schacter, 1985). Stochastic or functional independence between different 
tests of memory (Tulving, Schacter & Stark, 1982) were assumed to reflect different 
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types of memory. Stochastic independence refers to the relation between two events in 
which the probability of their joint occurrence is equal to the product of the probabilities 
of the occurrence of each event alone, while functional independence is the relation 
between two dependent variables in a situation in which one variable does and the other 
does not vary as a function of a third independent variable (Tulving, 1985). Increased 
performance on indirect measures of memory in the absence of explicit memory 
(stochastic) or the manipulation of an independent variable affecting only one form of 
memory and not the other (functional), were taken as evidence for the presence of two 
forms of memory. 
Stochastic independence between direct and indirect tests of memory has 
provided evidence supporting the existence of two memory processes. Tulving, Schacter 
and Stark (1982) employed a word fragment completion task to examine the relationship 
between recognition and priming effects. Their results were consistent with a distinction 
between separate sources of memory (i.e. implicit and explicit memory). Performance on 
a word fragment completion task was facilitated by the presentation of words in the study 
list and this facilitation was independent of explicit memory as indexed by recognition 
(Tulving, Schacter & Stark, 1982). The same affect was observed in series of 
experiments conducted by Jacoby and Dallas (1981) where facilitation on a word 
identification task was shown to be stochastically independent of a subjects’ explicit 
awareness that the words had been presented previously, as assessed by recognition tests. 
Functional independence between direct and indirect tests of memory has also 
provided evidence supporting the existence of two n^emory processes. Jacoby and Dallas 
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(1981) conducted experiments manipulating level of processing in word identification 
tasks where a single presentation of a word during study sometimes doubled the 
probability of that word being identified on a second list by subjects. A functional 
dissociation was also observed in Tulving, Schacter and Stark’s (1982) experiment where 
explicit memory was shown to be sensitive to time while implicit memory appeared to be 
unaffected by time, with the result that priming effects were largely unchanged after a 
week interval while recognition was found to be significantly diminished (Tulving, 
Schacter & Stark, 1982). 
Converging evidence in support of the distinction between explicit and implicit 
memory was found in the form of preserved learning in amnesic patients (Milner, Corkin 
& Teuber, 1968; McAndrews, Glisky & Schacter, 1987; Schacter, 1987). Amnesia is 
characterized by “normal perceptual, linguistic and intellectual functioning together with 
an inability to remember explicitly recent events and new information” (Schacter, 1987, 
p. 509). The observation of preserved learning and hence a form of memory in amnesic 
patients provided evidence in support of the hypothesis that there were at least two 
memory systems in operation . Milner, Corkin and Teuber’s (1968) work with H.M., a 
profoundly amnesic patient, provided evidence that some form of memory was preserved 
in prograde amnesic patients. H.M. was able to learn new motor skills even though he 
could not explicitly remember that he had performed the tasks previously (Milner, Corkin 
& Teuber, 1968). Observations of H.M.’s ability to learn new skills despite failure to 
explicitly remember that he had previously performed the skills was interpreted as 
evidence supporting the existence of separate sources of memory. 
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Dissociations on direct and indirect tests of memory have been shown with other 
amnesic patients who by definition, perform poorly on direct tests of memory but have 
been found to perform near normal on indirect tests of memory (Schacter, 1987). In a 
stem completion task amnesics were able to complete a stem with a word that was 
presented earlier, even though they were unable to recognize or recall that word on a 
direct test of their memory (Schacter, 1987). McAndrews, Glisky, and Schacter (1987) 
investigated the effects of priming in amnesic patients on complicated sentence puzzles 
and found that patients with no explicit recall or recognition showed substantial priming 
effects which lasted up to a week. Schacter (1985) found that amnesic patients showed 
near normal priming effects on a free-association test. However, normal priming effects 
only occurred when amnesic subjects were instructed to complete the stem or idiom with 
the first word that came to mind, if they were instructed to use the word stems as cues 
for remembering previously studied words, their performance was impaired compared to 
control subjects (Schacter, 1985; Graf, Squire & Mandler, 1984). In summary, 
dissociations between implicit and explicit tests of memory with amnesics patients 
supported the theory that there were at least two memory processes. 
Support for the distinction between implicit and explicit memory also has come 
fi:om studies that examined the effects of subliminally encoded stimuli. Kunst-Wilson and 
Zajonc (1980) demonstrated that subjects show implicit memory for subliminally 
presented stimuli even when they show no explicit memory for those events. Geometric 
shapes that were visually presented to subjects subliminally (presented too rapidly to be 
explicitly identified) were preferred on an indirect test in which subjects rated one of two 
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shapes (old and new) but were not recollected on a direct test for explicit memory of the 
shapes (Kunst-Wilson & Zajonc, 1980). 
Support for the distinction between implicit and explicit memory also came from 
studies examining levels of brain activity (Squire, 1992). During explicit and implicit 
memory tests different areas of the brain became activated, as indicated by higher levels 
of blood concentration. PET scans have also shown an increase in activity in the frontal 
lobe and the hippocampus during direct tests of memory which measure recognition, 
while an increase in activity has been shown in the occipital lobe during indirect tests of 
visual memory (Squire, 1992). This distinction provides biological evidence supporting 
the hypothesis that memory is not a unitary process (i.e., does not take place in a single 
location in the brain). 
Theories of Dissociations 
Observations of stochastic independence and functional dissociations have 
implications for our understanding of human memory. It is argued by some (e.g. Squire 
& Cohen, 1984; Squire, 1987; Tulving, 1985) that these observations reflect separate 
memory systems. 
Squire and Cohen (1984) argued that conscious or explicit recollection is a 
property of and supported by a declarative memory system. This declarative memory 
system is said to be involved in the formation of new representations or data structures 
(Squire, 1987). In contrast, implicit memory for prior occurrence is attributed to 
procedural systems where memory is expressed by ongoing modifications of procedures 
or processing operations (Squire, 1987). The distinction, as argued by Squire, (1987) is 
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not between different forms of memory, but between different processes, either of which 
can be used to retrieve the same representation. 
In a ternary classification of memory systems, Tulving (1985) proposed 
distinctions between procedural, episodic and semantic memory. Procedural memory 
was defined as being a reflection of immediate stimulus and response processing and is 
taken to reflect retention of learned connections between stimuli and responses. It allows 
one to respond adaptively to the environment without being aware of the relation 
between the present and past environment (Tulving, 1985). Semantic memory builds on 
procedural memory with the addition of the capability to internally represent states of the 
world that are not perceptually present. It too allows one to respond adaptively to the 
environment, but on a more sophisticated level. As with procedural memory, semantic 
memory does not support a direct awareness of the relation between the past and present 
(i.e., becoming better at naming objects in the world about you does not entail an 
awareness of each and every time you’ve used that name). Episodic memory allows one 
the additional capability of acquiring and retaining knowledge about specific personal 
experiences and specific uses of procedural and semantic memory. Each of the three 
memory systems is said to differ in its methods of acquisition, representation and 
expression of knowledge and in the kind of conscious awareness that characterizes its 
operation (Tulving, 1985). Evidence for the existence of these further classifications of 
memory distinctions followed from studies of explicit and implicit memory, with 
procedural/semantic memory being equated with implicit tests of memory and 
episodic/semantic with explicit tests of memory. 
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Limitations of Identifying Memory with Separate Tasks 
As pointed out by Jacoby (1991), one of the major problems in many of the 
experiments seeking to examine implicit and explicit memory, is that there is a problem 
with the process of identifying separate components of memory by using separate tasks 
for each component. Moreover, implicit and explicit memory tasks often reflect only a 
difference in instruction and typically they produce the same response. Thus, they are 
hard to measure separately. For example, the increased probability of completing a word 
stem with a word that was previously presented (Jacoby & Dallas, 1981; Tulving 
Schacter & Stark, 1982) could result from either an unconscious influence on memory 
(implicit) or from conscious retrieval of the prior presentation of that word (Jacoby, 
Kelley & Dywan, 1989). Thus, if subjects are asked to complete the stem BO with 
the first word that comes to mind, a correct response of BOAT (from a previous list) 
would be assumed to be due to implicit memory. However, one can not be sure that the 
subject did not explicitly recall that the word was in the study list and thus both implicit 
and explicit memory techniques could be used to respond appropriately. Therefore, 
different processes of memory can retrieve the same overt response (Squire, 1987). This 
can result in contamination of performance on indirect tests by intentional uses of 
memory and contamination of performance on direct tests by unconscious uses of 
memory (Jacoby, 1991; Toth, Reingold & Jacoby, 1994). 
The assumption that there is a one to one mapping between direct tests of 
memory with intentional memory and indirect tests with unconscious uses of memory has 
been labelled the factor-pure problem (Jacoby, 1991). The factor-pure problem 
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questions whether indirect tests of memory provide a valid estimate of the implicit 
component of memory, as performance on indirect tests may reflect both intentional and 
unconscious uses of memory . 
A second problem associated with examining separate components of memory 
with separate tasks is that subjects may be using different response criteria across the two 
tasks (Toth, et al, 1994). For example, the determined criteria for a subject to indicate 
that they recognize a word from a previous list in a test of recognition may be completely 
different fi'om the criteria they set for responding in a stem completion task with the first 
word that comes to mind. This leaves open the possibility that observed dissociations on 
direct and indirect tests may be due to differences in response criteria rather than separate 
memory processes. 
As a response to these limitations of identifying separate memory components 
with separate tasks, Jacoby (1991) proposed a process that put recollective and 
automatic memory in direct opposition within a single task. According to Jacoby (1991) 
the process dissociation procedure could separate the contributions of unconsciously and 
consciously controlled influences on niemory within a single task by using different 
instruction conditions, rather than identifying these processes with different tasks. This 
procedure provides estimates of recollective and automatic memory that are ‘process 
pure’ (Jacoby, 1991). Process dissociation allow for the detection of change (or lack of 
change) in the specific memory processes rather than assuming a one-to-one mapping 
between processes and tests as is required with task dissociations (Jacoby, 1991). 
18 
Process Dissociation 
The process dissociation procedure as described by Jacoby (1991) requires two 
explicit instruction conditions, inclusion and exclusion. In the inclusion condition, 
subjects attempt to retrieve a solution to a problem by one of two processes: by recalling 
an appropriate word from a previously studied list of words, or from pre-experimental 
knowledge. Thus, the inclusion test prompts subjects to use their recollective memory in 
addition to general problem solving skills to perform a task. If a studied word is 
produced it could be due to conscious retrieval or to pre-experimental knowledge, as 
both are operating when an individual is trying to recall a previously studied word. To 
separate unconscious and conscious retrieval techniques, performance is also measured in 
an exclusion condition. The exclusion condition requires subjects to complete a stem 
with a word that was not on the previous study list. The exclusion condition prompts 
subjects to use their recollective memory in order not to produce the studied word. The 
studied word would be produced only when subjects fail to consciously remember that it 
was on the previous list. This leads to the conclusion that if a studied word is produced 
more frequently than it would by chance, then it must be due to unconscious influences 
on memory. 
Assuming independence between recollective and automatic memory, Jacoby 
(1991) identified which processes were acting on responses to the inclusion and exclusion 
instructions and from these estimates, calculated the recollective and automatic uses of 
memory. In the inclusion condition, the probability of responding with a studied word is 
due to either recollection or familiarity. Thus the probability of responding with a studied 
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word in the inclusion test condition as put forth by Jacoby (1991) would be the 
probability of recollection (R) plus the probability of the word automatically coming to 
mind (A) without conscious recollection (1-R): 
Inclusion = R + A(1 -R), (1) 
In the exclusion condition the production of a studied word would be due to 
familiarity of the word with no conscious recollection of it being on the previous study 
list. Thus, the probability of producing the studied word in the exclusion condition as put 
forth by Jacoby (1991) would be the probability of the word automatically coming to 
mind (A) without recollection (1-R) of it being on the previously studied list: 
Exclusion = A( 1 -R). (2) 
Combining the results from the inclusion and exclusion conditions allowed for the 
assessment of recollective memory without the influence of familiarity. Subtracting the 
probability of producing a studied word in the exclusion condition from that probability 
in the inclusion condition provided an estimate of recollective memory: 
Recollection = Inclusion - Exclusion (3) 
Once an estimate of recollection is calculated, the automatic component can be calculated 
by dividing the probability of producing a studied word in the exclusion condition by the 
probability of a failure in recollection: 
Automatic = Exclusion/( 1 -R). (4) 
The effectiveness of the process dissociation procedure as compared to the 
identification of separate processes with separate tasks was examined by Jacoby (1991) 
in three experiments. On the basis of the results of these experiments, Jacoby (1991) 
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concluded that the estimations of recollective and automatic memory from the process 
dissociation procedure produced similar results as experiments that utilized separate tasks 
to estimate these memory processes. Thus, this new procedure was effective at 
separating the effects of recollective and automatic memory on performance. 
The process dissociation procedure has been used to separate the recollective and 
automatic components of memory in a number of studies. Examinations of manipulations 
of attention on recollective and automatic components of memory using the process 
dissociation procedure have indicated that divided attention at study reduces recollective 
memory while leaving automatic processes unchanged (Debner & Jacoby, 1994; Jacoby, 
1991; Jacoby & Kelley, 1992; Jacoby, Toth & Yonelinas, 1993; Jacoby, Woloshyn & 
Kelley, 1989; Jennings & Jacoby, 1993). Manipulations of age (Jennings & Jacoby, 
1993) and depression (Hertel & Milan, 1994) have also been examined with the process 
dissociation procedure and have been found to reduce recollective memory performance 
while leaving automatic memory unaffected. 
Using the process dissociation procedure, the effect of the manipulation of 
attention has been examined in a variety of tasks including stem completion tasks (Jacoby 
& Kelley, 1992; Jacoby, Toth & Yonelinas, 1993; Debner & Jacoby, 1994) and fame 
judgement experiments (Jennings & Jacoby, 1993; Jacoby, Woloshyn & Kelley, 1989) 
and with different stimuli at study including read words (Jacoby, 1991; Jacoby, Toth & 
Yonelinas, 1993), anagrams (Jacoby, 1991), aurally presented words (Jacoby, Toth & 
Yonelinas, 1993), and words flanked by pre- and post-masking words (Debner & Jacoby, 
1994) . In all of these studies the manipulation of attention was found to produce a 
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dissociation between estimates of recollective and automatic memory with one exception. 
Dividing attention was found to reduce both automatic and recollective memory for 
words that were presented aurally at study (Jacoby, Toth & Yonelinas, 1993). 
The results of these studies indicate that the distinction between automatic and 
recollective memory can be shown empirically with the process dissociation procedure. 
This ability to quantify the recollective and automatic components of memory has 
implications for psychology in general. Research in the areas of eye-witness testimony, 
false memory syndrome and memory misattiibution are based on human ability to 
differentiate between recollective and automatic sources of memory. Research in eye- 
witness testimony could examine the affects of misleading information on recollective and 
automatic memory for the original events. In the same maimer, the affect of misleading 
information on children’s memories could be examined in terms of recollective and 
automatic sources of memory. The induction of false memories may be due to 
misattributing feelings of familiarity based on automatic memory to recollective memory. 
With the ability to separate the recollective and automatic sources of memory with the 
process dissociation procedure, these and other venues of research are available. 
Limitations of Process Dissociation 
Although the process dissociation procedure solves some of the problems 
involved in separating recollective and automatic components of memory, it has some 
limitations. One limitation of process dissociation and its use of separate inclusion and 
exclusion responses (Jacoby, 1991) is that independence between recollective and 
automatic influences of memory is assumed but can not be directly assessed. Support for 
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this assumption has come indirectly in the form of evidence demonstrating that 
recollective and automatic memory are manipulated by different variables (e.g. Jacoby, 
1991; Jacoby, Toth & Yonelinas, 1993; Jennings & Jacoby, 1993). However, a direct 
test of this assumption, which is critical for calculations in the process dissociation 
procedure, is not possible with the use of separate instruction conditions. 
A second limitation in the use of the process dissociation procedure (Jacoby, 
1991) is that it assumes that subjects are using the same response criterion in the separate 
test instructional conditions. For example, a subject’s criteria for responding with a 
studied word in the exclusion condition may be higher than in the inclusion condition. 
Because responses are gathered from two instructional conditions, one can not be certain 
if the source of differences between tests are those assumed by the process dissociation 
procedure, to differences in responses criteria, or both. 
The present experiments test a procedure of reconstructing inclusion and 
exclusion responses using simultaneous rather than separate judgements. Such a 
procedure avoids the problems associated with examining separate components of 
memory by manipulating the two sets of separate test instructions. The simultaneous 
response procedure requires that subjects make judgements about fame and memory for 
prior occurrence, simultaneously. This procedure provides a direct method of assessing 
independence between recollective and automatic memory. 
Simultaneous Response Procedure 
It is proposed that simultaneous judgements be made using a four-alternative 
forced-choice paradigm as presented in Table 1. Subjects responded to a name as: A) 
famous and remembered from the study list, B) not famous and remembered, C) famous 
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and not remembered, or D) not famous and not remembered. It is proposed that 
inclusion and exclusion can be reconstructed from these simultaneous judgements about 
fame and recollection. The inclusion condition can be estimated by summing the 
probability of responding to choices A, B, and C from the 4-altemative forced-choice 
paradigm: 
Inclusion = P(A)+P(B)+P(C) (5) 
The exclusion condition can be estimated by the probability of responding to choice C: 
the name is famous and it was not presented earlier: 
Exclusion = P(C) (6) 
Condition (C) is functionally similar and perhaps identical to Jacoby’s (1991) exclusion 
condition as it assesses the familiarity of a response when the subject believes it was not 
presented earlier. 
Insert Table 1 about here 
It is proposed that once the inclusion and exclusion responses are reconstructed 
in the simultaneous response procedure, then the recollective and automatic components 
of memory can be calculated using formulas given by Jacoby (1991). Thus, formulas (3) 
and (4) presented earlier for calculating recollective and automatic components of 
memory from separate judgements of inclusion and exclusion will also be used for 
calculating recollective and automatic components of memory from simultaneous 
judgements. Assessment of how well the simultaneous response procedure predicts 
responses in the process dissociation procedure using separate inclusion and exclusion 
responses will be based on these estimates of recollective and automatic memory. 
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Experiment 1 
The first experiment examined the feasibility and utility of using simultaneous 
responses as a substitute for separate inclusion and exclusion responses. A replication of 
Jennings and Jacoby (1993) using the process dissociation procedure with separate 
responses was used as a baseline for comparison of the simultaneous response procedure. 
Separate inclusion and exclusion judgements and simultaneous judgements about fame 
and memory for prior occurrence were examined following a manipulation of attention 
used to provoke a pattern of dissociation between recollective and automatic sources of 
memory. 
Jennings and Jacoby (1993) used judgements of fame to examine recollective and 
automatic sources of memoiy. Earlier research (Jacoby, Woloshyn & Kelley, 1989) had 
indicated that the familiarity of a name that is read in a prior experimental condition can 
be mistaken for the familiarity that characterizes a famous name. In their experiments, 
there was an increased probability of mistaking a nonfamous name that was presented 
during the study phase of the experiment as being famous (Jennings & Jacoby, 1993; 
Jacoby, Woloshyn & Kelley, 1989). To provide a functional measure of independence, 
Jennings and Jacoby (1993) manipulated attention during the study period. Dissociations 
between recollective and automatic memory have been shown with manipulations of 
attention (Jacoby, Woloshyn & Kelley, 1989). That is, dividing attention has been shown 
to reduce recollective memory while leaving automatic memory intact (Debner & Jacoby, 
1994; Jacoby, 1991; Jacoby Kelley, 1992; Jacoby et al., 1989; Jacoby, Toth & 
Yonelinas, 1993; Jennings & Jacoby, 1993). Jacoby et al. (1989) suggested that dividing 
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subjects attention makes it more difficult for subjects to consciously recollect the names 
that are presented earlier but does not impair subject’s feelings of familiarity. A 
manipulation of attention was incorporated in the present study to determine whether 
estimates of recollective and automatic memory derived from simultaneous responses 
would show the same dissociations between recollective and automatic memory observed 
with separate inclusion and exclusion instructions. 
Subjects in the control or separate judgement groups responded using the 
inclusion and exclusion instruction sets described by Jacoby (1991). The inclusion 
condition instructed subjects to respond “famous” when they recognized a name as being 
famous or when they recognized a name as being on a previous list that they read. The 
exclusion condition instructs subjects to respond “not famous” if they recognized a name 
as being on a previous list that they read. 
Subjects in the simultaneous judgement condition responded using 4-altemative 
forced-choices described in Table 1. When presented with a name, subjects in the 
simultaneous judgement condition responded with one of the four choices which 
indicated whether or not the name was famous and whether or not it was presented 
previously. This method did not require separate inclusion and exclusion instruction 
conditions. 
In summary, the present investigation evaluated the feasibility and utility of using 
simultaneous judgements rather than separate judgements to derive estimates of 
recollective and automatic memory using the equations described in the process 
dissociation procedure. Attention was manipulated to provide a measure of dissociation 
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between recollection and fame judgements in both separate and simultaneous groups. 
The study sought to replicate the pattern of findings described by Jennings and Jacoby 
(1993) with simultaneous and separate judgements. A benefit of simultaneous 
judgements is that it is possible to directly assess the independence between recollective 
and automatic memory, an assumption that is critical for calculations in the process 
dissociation procedure. 
Based on earlier research (Jacoby & Kelley 1992; Jacoby, Toth & Yonelinas 
1993; Jacoby, Woloshyn & Kelley 1989; Jennings & Jacoby 1993) several hypotheses 
were made. First, we expected that subjects would indicate famous for studied 
nonfamous-names more often than for nonstudied nonfamous-names in the inclusion 
instruction condition. No predictions were made for the exclusion condition. The 
prediction was based on the fact that the inclusion condition instructs subjects to indicate 
famous for those names that they recognize as being on the previous study list, hence, 
studied names should be judged as famous more often than nonstudied names in the 
inclusion condition. Second, and more importantly, we expected that the estimates of 
recollective and automatic memory would be quantitatively and qualitatively identical for 
simultaneous and separate judgements. The estimates would be qualitatively identical if 
subjects in the divided attention condition showed a reduction in their recollective 
memory performance while leaving performance on automatic memory unchanged, for 
both the simultaneous and separate response alternatives. Finally, it was hypothesized 
that recollective and automatic components of memory would be independent. 
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The analysis of stochastic independence between recollective and automatic 
memory was performed in two ways. First, we compared the mean observed and 
predicted values for each subject. Second, we collapsed the data over subjects and 
compare observed with expected for a single 2x2 table using a single estimate of 
dependence - Yules Q (Yule, 1900; Hayman & Tulving, 1989). Yules 2 is a measure of 
stochastic independence that produces an estimate of the degree of association between 
recollective and automatic sources of memory. Yule’s Q is identical to Gamma in a 2x2 
table (Goodman & Kruskal, 1954), and is calculated by the following formula: 
Yule’s = (ad-bc)/(ad+bcX (7) 
where a, b, c and d represent the four cells of a 2x2 contingency table (see Table 1). The 
range of Yule’s Q is symmetric about 0, with -1 referring to complete negative 
dependence, +1 referring to complete positive dependence and 0 to neutral or no 
dependence (Hayman & Tulving, 1989). 
Method 
Subjects 
Sixty-four subjects were recruited from Introductory Psychology courses at 
Lakehead University and received credit for their participation. Ethical approval was 
obtained prior to the start of the experiment. The subjects were randomly assigned to 
one of 4 groups with 16 subjects in each. 
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Materials 
The stimuli used in this experiment were 120 nonfamous-names and 120 famous- 
names described by Jennings and Jacoby (1993) for young subjects (see Appendix B and 
C, respectively). Jennings and Jacoby (1993) selected the nonfamous-names from lists 
used in prior experiments and from the telephone book. The names were matched with 
the famous-names on the following criteria: gender as indicated by the first name, 
nationality of first and last name, the number of first and last names beginning with a 
given letter, and the length of the first and last names. Examples of nonfamous-names 
are Rudolph Ashe and Dorothy Drumm. The famous-names were selected by Jennings 
and Jacoby (1993) on the basis that they would be generally recognizable as famous, but 
that frequently subjects would not be able to identify what had made that individual 
famous. This criteria was used to encourage subjects to base their fame judgements on a 
name’s familiarity rather than it’s identifiability (Jennings and Jacoby, 1993). Examples of 
famous-names include Joan Baez, Minnie Pearl and Salman Rushdie. 
For purposes of counterbalancing, the 120 nonfamous-names were divided into 
four sub-lists of 30. Two sets of 30 were presented at study and test and were referred 
to as “studied nonfamous-names”. The other two sets of 30 names were presented only 
during the testing phase of the experiment and referred to as “nonstudied nonfamous- 
names”. The two sub-lists of studied nonfamous-names were required for separate test 
instruction conditions (inclusion and exclusion) in the separate judgement groups and in 
pseudo conditions in the simultaneous judgement groups. The sub-lists of names were 
counterbalanced by being rotated through all of the test conditions. Thus, each set of 30 
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nonfamous-names appeared an equal number of times in each condition, namely 
studied/nonstudied and inclusion/exclusion. Although not strictly necessary, the names 
were split and counterbalanced in the same way for the simultaneous judgement groups. 
The famous-names were presented only during the test phases of the experiment. 
The 120 famous-names were divided into two sets of 60, and were referred to as 
“nonstudied famous-names”. The two sets of 60 nonstudied famous-names were shown 
in separate test instruction conditions in the separate judgement groups and in the 
corresponding sub-list conditions in the simultaneous judgement groups. The sub-lists of 
famous-names were rotated between the inclusion and exclusion conditions. 
Subjects in the divided attention condition performed a listening task previously 
used by Craik (1982) and Jennings and Jacoby (1993). Subjects were required to detect 
target sequences of three odd numbers in a row (e.g. 3,5,7) from a list taken from 
Jennings and Jacoby (1993). The numbers were random with the exception that a 
minimum of one and a maximum of five numbers occurred between targeted sequences 
and not more than two even numbers could occur in a row. The list of numbers is 
included in Appendix D and is the same as that used by Jennings and Jacoby (1993). 
Auditory names of the digits were produced by a voice synthesizer driver through a 
speaker attached to the Apple He computer. 
An Apple He computer and monitor was used to present the study and test 
stimuli. Subjects’ judgements about fame and memory for prior occurrence were made 
on a keyboard and recorded by a computer program. Data was stored and scored by the 
same program. 
30 
. Experimental Design 
A 2x2x2x2 design was used in the present study with prior occurrence of names 
(studied versus nonstudied names) and instruction condition (inclusion versus exclusion) 
as within-subject factors and attention (full versus divided) and response alternatives 
(simultaneous judgement versus separate judgement groups) as between-subjects factors. 
Subjects were randomly assigned to one of four groups, separate judgement groups with 
full or divided attention, or simultaneous judgement groups with full or divided attention. 
Dependent measures in Experiment 1 were inclusion and exclusion responses and 
estimates of recollective and automatic memory. 
The separate judgement condition was a replication of Jacoby and Jennings 
(1993) study. Subjects made judgements about fame and prior occurrence from separate 
inclusion and exclusion instructions conditions. The simultaneous judgement groups 
required subjects to rate each name for fame and for prior occurrence simultaneously 
using the 4-altemative forced-choice paradigm (see Table 1) and provided an opportunity 
to investigate the relation between subject responses about fame and memory for prior 
occurrence. 
Procedure 
Subjects were tested individually by the experimenter in a small room equipped 
with a computer. There were separate study and test phases. The study phase was 
identical for the separate judgement and simultaneous judgement groups. Subjects were 
required to read 60 nonfamous-names out loud that were presented on the Apple lie 
monitor. The first and last name were presented simultaneously for 2 seconds in the 
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centre of the screen on one line. The initial letter of each first and last name was 
capitalized (e.g. Patsy Kinsella). 
In the divided attention condition, subjects performed an additional listening task 
while reading the names out loud. The listening task required subjects to listen to a 
spoken series of numbers and to identify target sequences of 3 odd numbers in a row 
(e.g., 3,7,5). Subjects raised their hand to indicate when they detected a target 
sequence. Subjects were instructed to be as accurate as possible, and were given a 
sample list of digits to familiarize themselves with the procedure. The experimenter 
informed subjects if they had missed two sequences of odd numbers in a row by saying 
“Miss”. Subject accuracy on this task was also recorded. Instructions for the divided 
attention task were the same for all subjects and appears in Appendix A. 
The timing between words was the same for full and divided attention conditions. 
In the full attention condition, the computer program generated the same sounds as in the 
divided attention condition, however, the sounds were not produced through the voice 
synthesizer. This ensured that the duration of the study phase was the same for both foil 
and divided attention conditions. 
A two minute break immediately followed the study phase of the experiment in 
which the experimenter engaged subjects in conversation. At the end of the two minutes, 
a computer prompt indicated that the test phase of the experiment was to begin. 
Instructions for the testing phase of the experiment were then explained to subjects. 
All subjects in the separate judgement groups had two instruction conditions. 
The inclusion condition came first for all subjects and was followed by the exclusion 
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condition (Jennings & Jacoby, 1993). In the inclusion condition subjects were required 
to make fame judgements on a list of 60 famous and 60 nonfamous-names. Thirty of the 
nonfamous-names were from the study list. Subjects were instructed to assume that all 
of the names presented during the study phase were famous-names. Subjects were then 
told to indicate “famous” when they recognized the name as being famous or if they 
recognized the name from the study list. They were instructed to call a name “not 
famous” if they did not recognize it as being in the study list or they did not recognize it 
as being a famous name. 
Instructions for the exclusion condition were given to all subjects following 
completion of the inclusion condition. In the exclusion condition subjects were 
instructed to assume that all of the names on the study list were not famous. Subjects 
were then required to make fame judgements on a new list of 60 famous and 60 
nonfamous-names, 30 of which were presented previously on the study list. Subjects 
were told to respond “not famous” if they recognized a name as being on the study list or 
did not recognize it as famous. A summary of the inclusion and exclusion instructions 
remained on the screen for the duration of that condition, and subjects responded famous 
or not famous by pressing either the closed apple key or the open apple key on the 
computer keyboard, respectively. 
All subjects in the simultaneous judgement groups were given the same 
instructions as the separate judgement subjects during the study phase. Subjects were 
required to make fame judgements and judgements about prior occurrence on a list of 
120 famous and 120 nonfamous-names. Two test blocks were used to parallel the 
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sequential structure of the separate judgement groups’ inclusion and exclusion 
conditions. During each segment 30 studied nonfamous-names, 30 nonstudied 
nonfamous-names and 60 famous-names were presented to all subjects. Responses to 
each name were one of the 4-altemative forced-choices. As each name was presented 
subjects decided whether the name was famous and presented in the study list, famous 
but not in the study list, not famous but in the study list, or not famous and not in the 
study list. Instructions for the simultaneous judgement groups remained on the screen 
for the duration of the experiment. Subjects’ judgements were recorded and scored by 
condition by the computer program. Appendix A describes instructions given to subjects 
in the separate judgement and simultaneous judgement groups. 
The results of inclusion and exclusion judgements are reported first. The 
estimations of recollective and automatic memory derived from the inclusion and 
exclusion responses will be reported in following sections. All t-tests reported are two- 
tailed. Values presented in parentheses are means. 
Results 
Divided Attention Performance at Study 
In the divided attention condition, subjects failed to detect a mean of 3.9 of the 17 
possible target sequences (23%) for the listening task. Subjects made false alarms, 
indicating an odd sequence when there wasn’t one, on an average of 2 times during the 
divided attention task. There was no difference between the separate judgement group 
(4.3) and the simultaneous judgement group (3.5) (^(30)<1, ns) on this task. 
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Inclusion and Exclusion 
The mean probability of inclusion and exclusion responses for the separate and 
simultaneous judgement groups as a function of fiill and divided attention are presented 
in Table 2. The probability of rating a nonfamous-name as famous in the inclusion and 
exclusion conditions was calculated using formulas (1) and (2) for the separate 
judgement groups and was calculated for the simultaneous judgement groups using 
formulas (5) and (6). Overall, the pattern of results were in accordance with what was 
predicted. Fame responses to nonfamous-names appeared to be greater for studied 
names compared to nonstudied names in the inclusion condition but not in the exclusion 
condition. Fame responses to studied nonfamous-names appeared to be greater in the 
inclusion compared to the exclusion condition. A similar pattern was observed for 
subjects responding with separate and simultaneous judgements. However, responses in 
the simultaneous groups appeared to be greater than in the separate groups in the 
inclusion condition, while the opposite pattern was observed in the exclusion condition, 
where responses in the separate groups appeared to be greater than the simultaneous 
groups. 
Insert Table 2 about here 
Significance of the differences observed between these means was assessed with a 
2x2x2x2 mixed ANOVA comparing prior occurrence of names (studied versus 
nonstudied) and instruction (inclusion versus exclusion) as within-subject factors and 
attention (full versus divided) and response alternatives (separate versus simultaneous) as 
between-subjects factors. There was a significant main effect of prior occurrence 
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(F(l,60)=264.01,/>=0.0001,M*S'e= 0097) and instruction (F(l,60)=355,54,/?=0.0001, 
Mse=.0142), as well as a significant interaction between prior occurrence and instruction 
(F(1,60)=267.69,/7=0.0001, MSe=.0078) which was consistent with the observation that 
fame responses were greater for the inclusion (.398) compared to the exclusion condition 
(.118) and that the effect of prior presentation was observed only in the inclusion 
condition (.588 versus .207 for studied and nonstudied names). There was a significant 
three-way interaction between prior occurrence, instruction and attention (discussed in 
the following paragraph), but it did not affect interpretation of the two-way interaction. 
The significant three-way interaction involving prior occurrence and instruction 
was with attention, F(l,60)=13.67, /?=0.0001, MS'e=.0078. This was in addition to the 
significant main effects of prior occurrence and instruction discussed previously, and a 
two-way interaction between prior occurrence and attention (F(l,60)=5.23, /?=0,026, 
M5e=.0097) with no main effect of attention (i^<l). Inspection of the means suggests 
that the effect of attention was seen only for studied nonfamous-names in the inclusion 
condition. A t-test comparing the means of responding to studied names in the inclusion 
condition for full (.646) and divided attention (.529) was significant (^(62)=3.59, 
/?=0.006), revealing that dividing attention reduced performance only for studied names 
in the inclusion condition. 
There was a significant interaction between instruction and response alternatives 
(F(l,60)=20.24, p=0.0001, MS'e=.0142) where fame responses were greater for 
simultaneous than separate (.444 versus .325) in the inclusion condition, while the 
opposite was true for the exclusion condition (.077 versus ,158). Using theM^e term 
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from the ANOVA a critical difference (Fisher’s LSD) was calculated to be .060, (p=.05, 
two-tailed). Comparison of the means using this critical difference revealed that the 
difference in responses for simultaneous and separate was significant for both inclusion 
and exclusion conditions. All other main effects and interactions with the response 
alternatives were not significant (F’s<l), suggesting that both procedures had the same 
effect on inclusion and exclusion. 
Recollective Memory 
The effect of the manipulation of attention on the estimates of recollective 
memory was compared between simultaneous and separate groups. Estimates of 
recollective memory were calculated using equation (3) for both simultaneous and 
separate groups. The mean proportions of recollective memory estimates for studied and 
nonstudied nonfamous-names are presented in Table 3 in the left two columns. The 
results were largely consistent with predictions. Divided attention compared to full 
attention produced decrements in recollective memory in both response conditions. 
However, unexpected quantitative differences were observed between the simultaneous 
and separate groups, with estimates of recollective memory being higher for the 
simultaneous compared to separate judgement groups. 
Insert Table 3 about here 
Significance was assessed using a 2x2 ANOVA with attention (full versus 
divided) and response alternatives (separate versus simultaneous) as between-subjects 
factors. There was a significant main effect of attention (F(1,60)= 14.052, /?=0.0001, 
MSe=.022) where recollective memory was found to be greater for full (.531) compared 
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to divided attention (.392). There was a significant main effect of response alternatives 
(F(l,60)=14.052,/?=0.001, MS'e=.022) where recollection of studied nonfamous-names 
was greater in the simultaneous (.531) compared to the separate judgement groups 
(.392). The interaction between attention and response alternatives was not significant 
(F<1) indicating that both the separate and simultaneous groups showed a similar 
decrease in recollective memory with divided compared to full attention. 
Automatic memory 
The effect of the manipulation of attention on the estimates of automatic memory 
were compared between simultaneous and separate groups. Estimates of automatic 
memory were calculated by using equation (4) for both simultaneous and separate 
groups. The mean proportions of automatic memory estimates for studied and 
nonstudied nonfamous-names are presented in the right two columns of Table 3. As 
predicted, the manipulation of attention did not appear to affect estimates of automatic 
memory for studied nonfamous-names. However, estimates of automatic memory 
appeared to be higher for the separate compared to the simultaneous groups. 
Significance was assessed using a 2x2 ANOVA with attention (full versus 
divided) and response alternatives (separate versus simultaneous) as between-subject 
factors. The main effect of attention and the interaction between attention and response 
alternatives were not significant (all i^s<l). This confirmed that the manipulation of 
attention did not affect estimates of automatic memory for either separate or 
simultaneous groups. There was a significant main effect of response alternatives 
F(l,60)=10.3,/?=0.002, MiSe=.0228, where automatic fame responses were greater for 
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separate (.253) compared to simultaneous (.159). Thus, subjects responding to the 
separate inclusion and exclusion conditions had an advantage over subjects in the 
simultaneous judgement groups when attributing fame to studied names on the basis of 
familiarity. 
Independence 
Independence between estimates of recollective and automatic memory was 
assessed for the simultaneous groups only. The observed marginal mean probabilities for 
recollection and fame judgements and the observed and expected probabilities are given 
in Table 4 for studied and nonstudied nonfamous-names. The recollective probabilities 
are identical to data presented in Table 3, while fame judgements are the observed sum of 
Cells A and C (see Table 1) rather than conditional estimates of fame used in the process 
dissociation procedure. Fame judgements reflect the knowledge of subjects about 
whether a name was famous irrespective of whether it was recalled as being studied or 
not. Whereas the process dissociation estimates of automatic memory are based on 
subjects’ knowledge of fame in the absence of memory for prior occurrence and the 
assumption of independence between recollection and automatic memory. If fame 
judgements and recollection were independent then the estimates of automatic memory 
would equal the marginal total for fame judgements. Independence, however, was tested 
with the conventional method where the observed intersect of the two responses (i.e., 
both recalled and judged famous) is compared with the expected value (i.e., the product 
of the marginal probabilities of recall and fame responses). 
Insert Table 4 about here 
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The analysis of stochastic dependence between recollective and automatic 
memory was performed in two ways. First, we compared observed and expected values 
for each subject, and second, we collapsed over subjects and compared observed with 
expected in a single 2x2 table. 
In the within-subject comparison, we calculated Cell A for each subject and 
derived an expected value for each subject by multiplying the probability of a fame 
judgement with the probability of recollection. This expected value was compared with 
the observed for each subject. For the overall sample, the observed value was lower 
(.065) than the expected value (.083) (/(31)=3.89,/?=0.0001). The same pattern of 
observed lower than expected was found for each attention condition (.077 versus .092, 
/(15)=2.40,/?=.03 for fiill attention; .052 versus .075, ^(15)=3.03,/?=.008 for divided 
attention). Because the observed A cell means were less than the expected values for 
studied nonfamous-names, judgements of recollection and fame were found to be 
negatively related. 
The data was collapsed across subjects into a single 2x2 table to link the results to 
previous work examining different judgements of memory (e.g., Hayman & Tulving, 
1989; Hayman & Rickards, 1995; Tulving, Schacter & Stark, 1982). Using Yules Q, the 
single 2x2 table also provided a measure of the degree of dependence between the two 
sources of memory. Yules Q (Yule, 1900; Hayman & Tulving, 1989) also known as 
Gamma (Goodman & Kruskal, 1954) was calculated using equation (7). The range of Q 
(-1 to +1) is symmetric about 0, with the end points corresponding to complete negative 
or positive association and with 0 corresponding to no association (Hayman & Tulving, 
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1989). The Q statistic was calculated for fiall and divided attention and for the overall 
sample (2’s = -0.303, -0.270, -0.289, respectively). The negative dependence, although 
small, was significant for full attention (%\l, N=240)= 4.97,/>=0.05) and when the data 
was collapsed over attention conditions (x^(l, N=480)=9.606,/?<0.01) but not for the 
divided attention condition (%\l, N=240)=2.19, ns). The findings imply that for studied 
names, judgements about recollective and automatic components of memory appear to be 
negatively dependent. 
The relation is said to be negatively dependent because observed probabilities for 
Cell A were lower than the expected probabilities (see FaRec for observed and Fa*Rec 
for expected values in Table 4). In contrast, observed probabilities for Cell C, as given 
by the Exclusion column in Table 2, were higher than expected. Thus, subjects are 
responding less than expected to Cell A which increases their probability of responding to 
Cell C. It is mathematically necessary that observed values of Cell D differ from the 
expected values in the same direction as values in Cell A, and that observed values of 
Cell B differ fi*om the expected values in the same direction as values in Cell C. 
The relationship between recollective and automatic sources of memory for 
nonstudied names was also compared within-subjects for full, divided and collapsed 
across attention conditions (all fs <1), and compared collapsed across subjects 
(Q's=0.172, -0.060 and 0.015, for full, divided and collapsed across attention conditions 
— all x^’s<l). This finding is consistent with the assumption that for nonstudied names, 
judgements about recollection and automatic components of memory are independent. 
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Reaction Times 
Subjects’ mean reaction times as a function of attention and responses alternatives 
are presented in Appendix E. Prior to analysis, the reaction times were examined for 
missing values and extreme scores (z > +3.00) which were omitted from the analyses, 
leaving 51 of the original 64 subjects. The missing data points occurred when a subject 
did not respond to one of the cells. One extremely high score was found in each of the 
four groups: separate group with full attention, separate group with divided attention, 
simultaneous group with full attention and simultaneous group with divided attention. 
Overall, reaction times appeared to be greater for simultaneous compared to separate 
groups. 
Significance was assessed with a 2x2 ANOVA with attention (fijll versus divided) 
and response alternatives (separate versus simultaneous) as between-subject factors^. 
There was a significant main effect of response alternatives (F(l, 47)=44.77,/?=0.0001, 
MS'e=7480.62) where reaction times were found to be greater for simultaneous (337.16) 
compared to separate (173.39). The main effect of attention and the interaction between 
attention and responses alternatives were not significant (F’s<l). 
Discussion 
Experiment 1 was conducted to examine the feasibility and utility of estimating 
recollective and automatic memory from inclusion and exclusion conditions derived fi'om 
simultaneous judgements about fame and memory for prior occurrence. These estimates 
were evaluated against a replication of Jennings and Jacoby’s (1993) experiment with 
expectations that the use of simultaneous judgements would quantitatively and 
42 
qualitatively replicate those findings. A manipulation of attention was used to provoke a 
pattern of dissociation between recollective and automatic memory, as estimated by both 
simultaneous and separate response alternatives (Debner & Jacoby, 1994; Jacoby, 1991; 
Jacoby & Kelley, 1992; Jacoby et al., 1989; Jacoby et al, 1993; Jennings & Jacoby, 
1993). 
The reconstruction of inclusion and exclusion responses from simultaneous 
judgements produced similar effects as observed with separate inclusion and exclusion 
instructions. For both separate and simultaneous judgements, fame judgements were 
greater for studied nonfamous-names compared to nonstudied nonfamous-names in the 
inclusion, while no differences were observed in the exclusion condition. This indicates 
that subjects were following instructions for the separate instruction conditions, and that 
the use of simultaneous judgements effectively reconstructed those conditions. 
Estimates of recollection and automatic sources of memory for separate and 
simultaneous responses were found to be qualitatively but not quantitatively equivalent. 
Quantitative estimates of recollection were found to be greater for simultaneous 
judgements compared to separate judgements, while estimates of automatic memory 
were greater for separate judgements compared to simultaneous judgements. The same 
differences were noted for the inclusion and exclusion conditions with simultaneous 
greater than separate for the inclusion and separate greater than simultaneous for the 
exclusion condition. 
However, the manipulation of attention produced the same qualitative 
dissociation between recollective and automatic memory with separate and simultaneous 
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judgements. Specifically, dividing attention at study reduced estimates of recollective 
memory while leaving estimates of automatic memory unchanged. Thus, although we 
were unable to predict quantitative estimates of recollection and automatic memory with 
separate responses from simultaneous responses, we were able to predict qualitative 
differences. 
One interpretation of the quantitative differences observed between the separate 
and simultaneous judgements is to assume that processing demands with simultaneous 
retrieval are more rigorous or extensive than with separate retrieval. An increase in 
retrieval processing would be expected to increase the overall accuracy of recall for 
simultaneous compared to separate judgements, as was observed. 
The simultaneous response procedure provided a means to directly assess 
independence between recollective and automatic components of memory. The results 
indicated that recollective and automatic memory processes for nonfamous-names may be 
negatively dependent. Thus, although a functional dissociation between recollective and 
automatic memory was observed as a fiinction of the manipulation of attention, the 
stochastic relation between recollective and automatic memory responses was found to 
be slightly but significantly negatively dependent. Negative dependence is an unusual 
relation between different measures of memory. Independence is typically observed 
between tests of implicit and explicit memory (e.g. Blaxton, 1989; Hayman & Tulving, 
1989; Tulving, Schacter & Stark, 1982), while dependence is consistently positive 
between successive tests of explicit (recollective) memory (e.g. Ogilvie, Tulving, 
Paskowitz, & Jones, 1980; Postman, Jenkins & Postman, 1948; Rabinowitz, Mandler & 
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Patterson, 1977; Tulving & Watkins, 1975; Wallace, 1978; Watkins & Todres, 1978). In 
short, the negative dependence observed here is not consistent with previous research, 
which suggests that it could be occurring as a result of unique experimental conditions. 
One source of negative dependence might be the presence of a response bias. If 
subjects believed that there were few, if any, famous-names in the original study list, then 
such a bias would make subjects’ guesses about fame and prior occurrence negatively 
related. In effect, responses in Cell A, the name is famous and in the study list, would be 
less frequent than that expected by chance or the assumption of independence. A belief 
that there were few if any famous-names in the study list would be an accurate 
assessment of the true test conditions, as no famous-names were included in the original 
study list. If famous names actually occurred in the study list, then it is possible that this 
would remove the response bias between recall and fame judgements. Experiment 2 was 
conducted to examine whether the inclusion of famous-names at study would remove this 
bias and provide evidence for the independence between recollective and automatic 
memory. 
Experiment 2 
Experiment 1 found that engaging in a divided attention task reduced the 
recollection of studied nonfamous-names but not automatic judgements of fame. This 
was true of both separate and simultaneous groups. Tests of stochastic dependence 
revealed a significant negative dependence between judgements of recall and fame. This 
negative dependence might have been due to a response bias based on a subject’s 
awareness of a real negative contingency where the study list did not contain famous- 
names. If subjects were more or less aware of this fact, then they should be less willing 
to guess famous for a name that they remembered from the study list. 
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The second experiment was conducted to examine whether the inclusion of 
famous-names at study would remove the negative dependence observed between 
recollective and automatic components of memory in Experiment 1. It was hypothesized 
that the presence of famous-names at study should increase a subjects’ willingness to 
guess responses to Cell A, that is, it should increase a tendency to guess that the name is 
famous and was in the study list. Experiment 2 was also a replication of Experiment 1 
with one change: the inclusion of famous-names in the study list. We expected to 
replicate the principle findings of Experiment 1. Specifically, we hypothesized that the 
manipulation of attention would produce a dissociation between recollective and 
automatic memory, with divided attention producing decrements in recollective but not 
automatic memory. One the basis of Experiment 1, we expected to find quantitative 
differences between separate and simultaneous judgements with recollection and 
inclusion being greater for simultaneous compared to separate judgements. However, it 
was h5q)othesized that the inclusion of famous-names would remove the negative 
dependence observed in Experiment 1, and provide evidence that recollective and 
automatic components of memory are stochastically independent judgements. 
Method 
Subjects 
Sixty-four subjects were recruited from several psychology courses at Lakehead 
University. Subjects recruited from Introductory Psychology received credit for their 
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participation. The subjects were randomly assigned to one of 4 groups with 16 subjects 
in each group. 
Materials 
The stimuli used in this experiment were the same as those used in Experiment 1, 
with the exception that the famous-names were now divided into four sub-lists of 30 
names for purposes of counterbalancing, studied/nonstudied and inclusion/exclusion. As 
with the nonfamous-names, two sub-lists of 30 famous-names were presented at study 
and test and were referred to as “studied famous-names”. The other two sub-lists of 
famous-names were presented in separate test instruction conditions for the separate 
judgement groups and in separate test blocks for the simultaneous judgement groups and 
were referred to as “nonstudied famous-names”. As with the nonfamous-names, the sub- 
lists of famous-names were counterbalanced over 4 rotations, with each sub-list of 30 
names appearing equally often in each condition. 
Experimental Design and Procedure 
The experimental design and procedure for Experiment 2 was the same as 
Experiment 1 except for the inclusion of famous-names during study. This required that 
all subjects read 120 names out loud, 60 of which were famous and 60 were nonfamous. 
For the separate judgement groups during the testing phase, the inclusion and exclusion 
conditions were comprised of 30 studied famous and 30 studied nonfamous-names that 
were presented to subjects for fame judgements with 30 nonstudied famous and 30 
nonstudied nonfamous-names. Separate test phases were incorporated for the 
simultaneous judgement groups to mimic the separate judgement groups’ inclusion and 
47 
exclusion conditions. The sub-lists of names were presented to these subjects in the same 
way. 
The data were scored and reported separately for nonfamous and famous-names 
for inclusion and exclusion responses and for estimates of recollective and automatic 
memory. All t-tests reported are two-tailed and values presented in parentheses are 
means. 
Results 
Divided Attention Performance at Study 
In the divided attention condition, subjects failed to detect a mean of 8.75 of the 
36 possible target sequences (24%) for the listening task. Subjects made false alarms, 
indicating an odd sequence when there wasn’t one, on an average of 5 times during the 
divided attention task. There was no difference between the separate judgement group 
(9.38) and the simultaneous judgement condition (8.13), (/(30)<1, ns) on this task. 
Inclusion and Exclusion for Nonfamous-Names 
The mean probability of inclusion and exclusion responses for the separate and 
simultaneous judgement groups as a function of fiill and divided attention for nonfamous- 
names are presented in Table 5. Overall, the means were in the predicted direction. 
Fame responses to nonfamous-names appeared to be greater for studied names compared 
to nonstudied names in the inclusion condition but not in the exclusion condition. Fame 
responses to nonfamous-studied names appeared to be greater in the inclusion than the 
exclusion condition. A similar pattern was observed for subjects responding with 
separate and simultaneous judgements. As in Experiment 1, responses in the 
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simultaneous groups appeared to be greater than in the separate groups in the inclusion 
condition, while the opposite pattern was observed in the exclusion condition, where 
responses in the separate groups appeared to be greater than the simultaneous groups. 
Insert Table 5 about here 
Significance of the differences observed between these means was assessed with a 
2x2x2x2 mixed ANOVA comparing prior occurrence of names (studied versus 
nonstudied) and instruction (inclusion versus exclusion) as within-subject factors and 
attention (full versus divided) and response alternatives (separate versus simultaneous) as 
between-subjects factors. There was a significant main effect of prior occurrence 
(F(l,60)=349.98,/?=0.0001, A/iSe=.0078) and instruction (F(l,60)=302.89,/?=0.0001, 
MSe=.0162), as well as a significant interaction between prior occurrence and instruction 
(F(l,60)=307.58,/?=0.0001,MSe=.009), which was consistent with the observation that 
fame responses were greater for the inclusion condition (.369) compared to the exclusion 
condition (.091) and that the effect of prior presentation was observed only in the 
inclusion condition (.576 versus .161 for studied and nonstudied names). There was a 
significant three-way interaction between prior occurrence, instruction and attention 
(discussed in the following paragraph), but it did not affect interpretation of the two-way 
interaction. 
The significant three-way interaction involving prior occurrence and instruction 
was with attention, F(1,60)=10.09, /?=0.002, MSe=.009. This was in addition to the 
significant main effects of prior occurrence and instruction discussed previously, and a 
two-way interaction between prior occurrence and attention (F(l,60)=7.90,/?=0.007, 
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Mse=.0078). There was no main effect of attention (F<1). Inspection of the means 
suggests that the effect of attention was seen only for studied nonfamous-names in the 
inclusion condition. A t-test comparing mean responses to studied names in the inclusion 
condition for full (.625) and divided attention (.527) was significant (/(62)=2.29, 
/?=0.026), revealing that dividing attention reduced performance on studied names in the 
inclusion condition. 
There was a significant interaction between instruction and response alternatives 
(F(l,60)=13.11,/?=0.001, MSe=.01617) where fame responses were numerically greater 
for simultaneous than separate (.395 versus .343) in the inclusion condition and 
marginally lower in the exclusion condition (.059 versus . 124). Using the MSe term from 
the ANOVA, a critical difference (Fisher’s LSD) was calculated to be 0.064 (/?=.05, two- 
tailed). Comparison of the means using this critical difference confirmed that the 
difference between simultaneous and separate responses was significant only for the 
exclusion condition, and failed to be significant for the inclusion condition. All other 
main effects and interactions with the responses alternatives were not significant (F’s<l), 
suggesting that both procedures had the same effect on inclusion and exclusion. 
Recollective Memory for Nonfamous-Names 
The mean proportions of recollective memory estimates for studied and 
nonstudied nonfamous-names are presented in Table 6 in the left two columns. The 
results were consistent with predictions, divided attention compared to full attention 
produced decrements in recollective memory in both response conditions. As in 
Experiment 1, differences between simultaneous and separate groups were also observed, 
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with estimates of recollection being higher for the simultaneous compared to separate 
judgement groups. 
Insert Table 6 about here 
Significance was assessed using a 2x2 ANOVA with attention (full versus 
divided) and response alternatives (separate versus simultaneous) as between-subjects 
factors. There was a significant main effect of attention (F(l,60)=10.03,/?=0.002, 
MSe=.03) where recollective memory was found to be greater for full (.555) compared to 
divided attention (.486). There was a significant main effect of response alternatives 
(F(l,60)=5.56,^=0.02, MSe=.03) where recollection of studied nonfamous-names was 
greater in the simultaneous (.537) compared to the separate judgement groups (.435). 
The interaction between attention and responses alternatives was not significant (F<1) 
indicating that both the separate and simultaneous groups showed a similar decrease in 
recollective memory with divided compared to fiill attention. 
Automatic memory for Nonfamous-Names 
The mean proportions of automatic memory estimates for studied and nonstudied 
nonfamous-names are presented in the right two columns of Table 6. As expected, the 
manipulation of attention did not appear to change estimates of automatic memory for 
studied nonfamous-names. As in Experiment 1, estimates of automatic memory appeared 
to be higher for the separate compared to the simultaneous judgement groups. 
Significance was assessed using a 2x2 ANOVA with attention (fiall versus 
divided) and response alternatives (separate versus simultaneous) as between-subject 
factors. The main effect of attention (F= 1.11, W5) and the interaction between attention 
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and responses alternatives (F=1.42, ns) were not significant. This confirmed that the 
manipulation of attention did not significantly affect estimates of automatic memory for 
either separate or simultaneous groups. The main effect of response alternatives 
approached significance (F(l,60)=3.86,/?=0.054, MSe=.023), where automatic fame 
responses appeared to be greater for separate (.159) compared to simultaneous (.103). 
This suggests that subjects responding to the separate inclusion and exclusion conditions 
had a slight advantage over subjects in the simultaneous judgement groups when 
attributing fame to studied names on the basis of familiarity. 
Independence for Nonfamous-Names 
Independence between estimates of recollective and automatic memory was 
assessed for the simultaneous groups only. The observed marginal mean probabilities for 
recollection and fame judgements and the observed and expected probabilities are given 
in Table 7 for studied and nonstudied names. The recollective probabilities are identical 
to data presented in Table 6, while fame judgements are the observed sum of Cells A and 
C (see Table 1) rather than conditional estimates of fame used in the process dissociation 
procedure. Fame judgements reflect the knowledge of subjects about whether a name 
was famous irrespective of whether it was recalled as being studied or not. Independence, 
was tested by comparing the observed intersect of the two responses (i.e., both recalled 
and judged famous) with the expected value (i.e., the product of the marginal 
probabilities of recall and fame responses). 
Insert Table 7 about here 
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The analysis of stochastic dependence between recollective and automatic 
memory was performed in two ways. First, we compared observed and expected values 
for each subject, and second, we collapsed over subjects and compared observed with 
expected for a single 2x2 table. 
In the within-subject comparison, we calculated Cell A for each subject and 
derived an expected value for each subject by multiplying the probability of a fame 
judgement with the probability of recollection. The expected value was compared with 
the observed for each subject. For the overall sample, the observed value was only 
slightly lower (.063) than the expected value (.065) (t(31)<1, ns). A different pattern 
was found for the attention conditions (.053 versus .052 for full attention and .072 versus 
.077 for divided attention, all ^’s<l). Because the observed A cell means were not 
significantly different than the expected values for studied nonfamous-names, judgements 
of recollection and fame can be said to be independent. 
The data were collapsed across subjects into a single 2x2 table to link the results 
to previous work examining separate judgements of memory (e.g. Hayman & Tulving, 
1989; Hayman & Rickards, 1995; Tulving, Schacter & Stark, 1982). Yules Q was 
calculated for full and divided attention and for the overall sample (Q’s =.170, -.097, 
.065; all x^’s<l). This implies that, for nonfamous-names, judgements of recollective and 
automatic memory are independent. 
The relation between recollective and automatic sources of memory for 
nonstudied names was also compared for full, divided and collapsed across attention 
conditions between subjects (all t’s <1) and in a single 2x2 table (2’s=.079, -.052, .027 
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for full, divided and collapsed across attention —all x^’s<l). This implies that, for 
nonstudied nonfamous-names, judgements of recollective and automatic memory are 
independent. 
Inclusion and Exclusion for Famous-Names 
The mean probability of inclusion and exclusion responses for the separate and 
simultaneous judgement groups as a function of full and divided attention for famous- 
names are presented in Table 8. Fame responses to famous-names appeared to be greater 
for studied names compared to nonstudied names in the inclusion condition, while in the 
exclusion condition responses appeared to be greater for nonstudied names than for 
studied names. Fame responses to studied and nonstudied famous-names appeared to be 
greater for the inclusion compared to the exclusion condition. A similar pattern was 
observed for subjects responding with separate and simultaneous judgements, although 
responses in the separate groups appeared to be greater than in the simultaneous groups 
for both inclusion and exclusion. 
Insert Table 8 about here 
Significance was assessed with a 2x2x2x2 mixed ANOVA comparing prior 
occurrence of names (studied versus nonstudied) and instruction (inclusion versus 
exclusion) as within-subject factors and attention (full versus divided) and response 
alternatives (separate versus simultaneous) as between-subjects factors. There was a 
significant main effect of prior occurrence (jF(l,60)=25.86,/?=0.0001,M^e= 0213) and 
instruction (i^(l,60)=637.61,/7=0.0001,MS'e=.014), as well as a significant interaction 
between prior occurrence and instruction (F(l,60)=416.13,/»=0.0001, MS'e=.0098), 
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which was consistent with the observation that fame responses were greater for the 
inclusion (.814) compared to the exclusion condition (.441) and that the effect of prior 
presentation was observed for both conditions, but in opposite directions. Specifically, 
fame responses to studied names was greater than to nonstudied names (.894 versus 
.734) in the inclusion condition, while fame responses to studied names was lower than to 
nonstudied names (.268 versus .614) in the exclusion condition. There was a significant 
three-way interaction between prior occurrence, instruction and attention (discussed in 
the following paragraph), but it did not affect interpretation of the two-way interaction. 
The significant three-way interaction involving prior occurrence and instruction 
was with attention, F(l,60)=12.12, /?=0.001, MSe=.0098. This was in addition to the 
significant main effects of prior occurrence and instruction discussed previously, and a 
main effect of attention (F(l,60)=4.60,/?=0.036, MSe=.0736) and a significant two-way 
interaction between instruction and attention (F(l,60)=8.75,/?=0.004, MSQ=.0\A). 
Inspection of the means suggests that the effect of attention was seen only for studied 
famous-names in the exclusion condition. A t-test comparing the means of responding to 
studied names in the exclusion condition for full (.191) and divided attention (.346) was 
significant (t(62)=4.53,/?=0.0001), revealing that full attention reduced performance on 
studied names in the exclusion condition. 
There was a significant interaction between instruction and response alternatives 
(F(l,60)=6.30, /?=0.015, Mye=.014), as well as a main effect of response alternatives 
(F(1,60)=8.61,/7=0.005, MiS'e=.0737), where the difference between separate and 
simultaneous was larger in the exclusion (.509 versus .373) compared to the inclusion 
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condition (.845 versus .783). Using the MS's term, critical difference (Fisher’s LSD) was 
calculated and found to be 0.059, (p=0.05, two-tailed). Comparison of the means using 
this critical difference revealed that for both the inclusion and exclusion conditions the 
differences were significant. All other interactions with the response alternatives were 
not significant (attention by response alternatives, JF=1.02, MSQ=.0131, ns, prior 
occurrence by attention by response alternatives, F=1.6, MSQ- .0213, and all other 
Fs<l). 
Recollective Memory for Famous-Names 
The mean proportions of recollective memory estimates for studied and 
nonstudied famous-names are presented in Table 9 in the left two columns. Divided 
attention compared to full attention produced decrements in recollective memory in both 
response conditions. 
Insert Table 9 about here 
Significance was assessed using a 2x2 ANOVA with attention (full versus 
divided) and response alternatives (separate and simultaneous) as between-subjects 
factors. There was a significant main effect of attention (F(1,60)=18.89, />=0.0001, 
MSe=.026) where recollective memory was found to be greater for full (.712) compared 
to divided attention (.539). The main effect of response alternatives was not significant 
(F=2.64, MSe=.026, ns) as well as the interaction between attention and response 
alternatives (F<1) indicating that both the separate and simultaneous groups showed a 
similar decrease in recollective memory with divided compared to full attention. 
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Automatic Memory for Famous-Names 
The mean proportions of automatic memory estimates for studied and nonstudied 
famous-names are presented in the right two columns of Table 9. Estimates of automatic 
memory were greater for divided compared to full attention, for simultaneous groups, 
while attention had no effect on automatic memory for separate groups. However, 
estimates of automatic memory appeared to be higher for the separate compared to the 
simultaneous groups. 
Significance was assessed using a 2x2 ANOVA with attention (full versus 
divided) and response alternatives (separate versus simultaneous) as between-subject 
factors. There was a significant main effect of attention (F(l,60)=7.32, /?=0.009, 
MSe=.035) and response alternatives (F(l,60)=20.49,/?=0.0001, MSQ=.0ZS\ as well as a 
significant interaction between attention and response alternatives (F(l,60)=4.604, 
/?=0.036, A/Se=-4885), which was consistent with the observation that estimates of 
automatic memory were higher for separate (.822) compared to simultaneous (.610) and 
that the effect of attention was observed only in the simultaneous groups (.496 versus 
.723 for fiill and divided attention). But because the same interaction was observed for 
nonstudied famous-names (.541 versus .711) in the simultaneous groups, it is likely that 
the differences reflected changes in the decision criteria across conditions, rather than a 
difference due to memory. 
Independence for Famous-Names 
Independence between estimates of recollective and automatic memory was 
assessed for the simultaneous groups only. The observed marginal mean probabilities for 
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fame judgements and recollection and the observed and expected probabilities are given 
in Table 7 for studied and nonstudied famous-names. The data is presented in a similar 
fashion as the data for nonfamous-nanles. 
In the within-subject comparison, we calculated Cell A (see Table 1) for each 
subject and derived an expected value for each subject by multiplying the probability of a 
fame judgement with the probability of recollection. The expected value was compared 
with the observed for each subject. The means of the observed value was slightly greater 
(.488) than the expected (.471) (/(31)=2.65, /?=.013). The same pattern of observed 
greater than expected was found for full attention (.502 versus .478, ^(31)=2.18, 
/?=0.046), and the divided attention (.473 versus .463, /(31)=1.54, ns). Because the 
observed A cell means were greater than the expected values judgements of recollection 
and fame for studied famous-names, were found to be positively related. 
The data was collapsed across subjects into a single 2x2 table, and Yules Q 
(Yule, 1900; Hayman & Tulving, 1989) was calculated for full and divided attention and 
for the overall sample (0’s=.435, .416, .482, respectively). The positive dependence was 
significant for full (x^ (1, N=240)=9.88,/?<0.01) and divided attention (x^ (1, 
N=240)=8.46,/?<0.01), and when the data was collapsed over attention conditions (x^ 
(1, N=480)=27.03, /?<0.01). As in the previous analyses, these findings imply that 
subject responses about recollective and automatic components of memory were 
positively dependent for studied famous-names. 
The relationship between recollective and automatic sources of memory for 
nonstudied famous-names was also compared within-subjects. When collapsed across 
58 
attention conditions observed values were found to be numerically lower than expected 
(.069 versus .079, ^(31)=-1.97, ns). The same pattern was found for full attention (.058 
versus .066, t<l\ and divided attention where it proved to be significantly lower (.080 
versus .091, t(31)=-2.59, p=0.021). Comparisons of observed and expected values 
collapsed over subjects (2’s = -.477, -.314, -.406 for full, divided and collapsed across 
attention conditions) were significant for full attention (x^(l,N=240)=9.04,/?<0.01), and 
for the overall sample (x^(l,N=480)=12.02,/?<0.01), but not for the divided attention 
condition (x^(l,N=240)=2.97, ns). These findings imply that for nonstudied famous- 
names, subject responses about recollective and automatic sources of memory tended to 
be negatively dependent. 
Reaction Times 
Subjects’ mean reaction times as a function of attention and responses alternatives 
are presented in Appendix E. Prior to analysis, the reaction times were examined for 
missing values and extreme scores (z > +3.00) which were omitted from the analyses, 
leaving 45 subjects. The missing data points occurred when a subject did not respond to 
one of the cells. One extremely high score was found for each of the following: separate 
group with full attention, separate group with divided attention and simultaneous group 
with divided attention. Overall, reaction times appeared to be greater for simultaneous 
compared to separate groups. 
Significance was assessed with a 2x2 ANOVA with attention (full versus divided) 
and response alternatives (separate versus simultaneous) as between-subject factors^. 
There was a significant main effect of response alternatives (F(l, 41)=43.02,/?=0.0001, 
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MS!e=4946.58) where reaction times were found to be greater for simultaneous (303.02) 
compared to separate (167.36). The main effect of attention (F=3.98, MSe=4864.58, ns) 
and the interaction between attention and responses alternatives (F=2.38, MS^=A%64.59, 
ns) were not significant. 
Discussion 
Experiment 2 examined if the inclusion of famous-names at study would remove a 
small but significant negative stochastic dependence between recollective and automatic 
measures of memory which had been observed in Experiment 1. In Experiment 2 
estimates of recollective and automatic memory for nonfamous-names were found to be 
stochastically independent. Thus, the inclusion of famous-names appeared to have 
removed the response bias observed in Experiment 1. 
Experiment 2 also provided a replication of the pattern of results found in 
Experiment 1. As in Experiment 1, estimates of recollection and automatic sources of 
memory for separate and simultaneous responses were found to be qualitatively but not 
quantitatively equivalent. Quantitative estimates of recollection were found to be greater 
for simultaneous compared to separate judgements, while estimates of automatic memory 
were greater for separate compared to simultaneous judgements. The same differences 
were noted for the inclusion and exclusion conditions with simultaneous greater than 
separate for inclusion responses and separate greater than simultaneous for exclusion 
responses. It should be noted however, that the manipulation of attention produced the 
same qualitative dissociation between recollective and automatic memory in both 
separate and simultaneous judgement groups. Specifically, dividing attention at study 
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reduced estimates of recollective memory for nonfamous names while leaving estimates 
of automatic memory essentially unchanged. In summary, Experiment 2 replicated the 
pattern of results found in Experiment 1. 
Experiment 2 was different from Experiment 1 in that famous names were also 
presented in the study session. Many factors were found to be the same for famous- 
names as for nonfamous-names, except no differences were observed between 
simultaneous and separate judgements in recollective memory, and an effect of attention 
on automatic memory was observed for simultaneous judgements, with automatic fame 
responses greater in the divided than full attention conditions, for both studied and 
nonstudied famous-names. 
Of greater interest, positive dependence was observed between recollective and 
automatic memory judgements for studied famous-names and negative dependence was 
observed for nonstudied famous-names. In retrospect, it is not unreasonable to find a 
positive dependence between recall and judgements of fame because episodic memory for 
known names is expected to be better than for unknown names, and of course fame 
judgements for famous-names should be greater for known names than unknown names. 
A simple test of this prediction is to compare recollective and automatic memory for 
famous-names with that for nonfamous-names. In Experiment 2, recollective memory for 
studied famous-names (.625) was greater than nonfamous-names (.486) (/(63)=7.12, 
/?=.0001) and automatic judgements of fame for famous-names (.716) were greater than 
for nonfamous-names (. 171). In short, there is a common memory factor in both 
recollective memory and fame judgements, knowledge about famous-names 
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The negative dependence observed between judgements of recollective memory 
and fame with nonstudied famous-names is perhaps surprising in the presence of the 
positive dependence observed with studied famous-names but it could reflect a subjects' 
awareness of the positive dependence that actually exists between fame and recollection. 
Given such knowledge, subjects should exhibit a negative response bias when judging 
fame and prior occurrence of nonstudied famous-names. This negative responses bias 
would reflect the knowledge that famous names are more memorable and thus are likely 
to have been recalled if they had been presented at study. In those situations where a 
famous name is identified and the subject is uncertain about whether it was studied or 
not, then given the preceding assumption, the best strategy is to guess that the famous- 
name was not studied. That is, if a subject knows that a name was famous but is 
uncertain about whether they had studied it or not, then they should guess that they had 
not studied the name if it is assumed that a studied famous-names is likely to be recalled. 
In summary, the results of Experiment 2 found that the inclusion of famous names 
at study removed the negative dependence between recollective and automatic sources of 
memory observed in Experiment 1 for studied nonfamous-names and replicated the 
similarity in qualitative predictions of recollective and automatic memory for separate and 
simultaneous judgements. 
General Discussion 
The present research was designed to examine whether simultaneous judgements 
could be used to reconstruct separate judgements about fame and memory for prior 
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occurrence. A benefit of simultaneous judgements is that it avoids limitations associated 
with the use of separate judgements as required in the process dissociation procedure 
(Jacoby, 1991). Specifically, it avoids assumptions of independence and uncertainty 
about whether subjects are using the same response criteria across separate test 
conditions as required by the process dissociation procedure. The use of simultaneous 
judgements provides a means to directly assess independence between recollective and 
automatic components of memory, and provides a single set of instructions that allows 
for a straightforward interpretation of the results. 
The results of Experiment 1 and 2 suggest that simultaneous judgements 
qualitatively, but not quantitatively, replicated estimates of recollective and automatic 
memory. The manipulation of attention produced a qualitative functional dissociation 
between recollective and automatic memory in both simultaneous and separate judgement 
conditions. Specifically, the results of Experiment 1 and 2 found that engaging in a 
divided attention task reduced the probability of recollection of studied nonfamous-names 
but left automatic memory unchanged. This is consistent with previous findings (Debner 
& Jacoby, 1994; Jacoby, 1991; Jacoby & Kelley, 1992; Jacoby et al., 1989; Jacoby et al., 
1993; Jennings & Jacoby, 1993). 
An advantage of simultaneous judgements is that it provides researchers with 
additional information which can be used to check that assumptions about independence 
are met. With separate judgements independence can only be assessed indirectly. 
Although in Experiment 1 there appeared to be a small negative dependence between 
recollective and automatic memory judgements, the inclusion of famous names at study in 
Experiment 2 resulted in stochastic independence between recollective and automatic 
judgements of memory. 
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It appears that failure to meet the assumption of independence does not 
automatically remove the dissociation between recollective and automatic sources of 
memory. A negative dependence was observed between recollective and automatic 
memory in Experiment 1 and not in Experiment 2, but the pattern of relations between 
recollective and automatic memory judgements were the same in both experiments. 
One limitation of tests of stochastic independence as argued by Hintzman and 
Hartry (1991) is that findings of nonsignificant dependence does not mean that factors 
are independent. Rather, it may be that we failed to detect a small but significant 
dependence between recollective and automatic memory. In order for this to be a valid 
argument, there should be a small but consistent pattern of either positive or negative 
dependence within the data. It can be seen from examination of the data presented in 
Table 7 that for nonfamous-names this is not true. Instead, Yules Q represents 
insignificantly small positive and negative dependence and this is consistent with 
observations that vary about zero. Thus it is unlikely that dependence exists and was not 
detected between recollective and automatic sources of memory. 
The use of simultaneous judgements also avoids uncertainty about whether 
subjects are using the same criterion forjudging prior occurrence in different instruction 
conditions as occurs with separate test conditions. Buchner, Erdfelder and Vaterrodt- 
Pliinnecke (1995) and Curran and Hintzman (1995) have also called attention to the 
ambiguity associated with the assumption that the criterion for responding on the basis of 
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automatic and recollective memory is equivalent in the inclusion and exclusion 
conditions. With simultaneous judgements there is no need to make this assumption nor 
is there any need to attempt to correct for this possibility. 
The major advantage of using simultaneous judgements in the process 
dissociation procedure (Jacoby, 1991) to separate recollective and automatic sources of 
memory is that it allows for a direct assessment of independence. With this ability, one 
can examine whether specific materials possess the required independence between 
recollection and familiarity for calculations based on the process dissociation procedure. 
For example, in Experiment 2, at the same time as independence was observed for 
nonfamous-names, strong positive dependence was observed between recollection and 
fame judgements of studied famous-names. Although this too might be due to a response 
bias, it is likely that this dependence is intrinsic to the materials because the same 
knowledge about people mediates both episodic memorability and judgements of fame 
(see the Discussion of Experiment 2). Thus, the nature of the materials appears to affect 
the relation observed between recolleCtive and automatic sources of memory. The 
strategy of using simultaneous judgements allows one to ensure that specific materials 
produce the necessary independence between recollective and automatic sources of 
memory. 
Future research with simultaneous judgements for identifying and separating 
recollective and automatic influences on memory should focus on using the procedure 
with other materials that have been examined using the process dissociation procedure. 
For example, the simultaneous response procedure could be adapted and used in stem 
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completion tasks (Jacoby, Toth & Yonelinas, 1993; Debner & Jacoby), anagrams 
(Jacoby, 1991) aurally presented words (Jacoby, Toth & Yonelinas, 1993) and words 
flanked by pre- and post-masking words (Debner & Jacoby, 1994) to check the 
assumption of independence with those materials. 
The simultaneous response procedure, with its simpler instructions might be a 
useful alternative in populations that find inclusion and exclusion instructions arbitrary. 
For example, instructions for the simultaneous responses procedure might be more 
appropriate for older populations as data from one third of the older subjects in Jennings 
and Jacoby’s (1993) study had to be discarded as they were unable to follow the separate 
inclusion and exclusion instructions. Studies examining recollective and automatic 
memory might also be easier to perform with children using simultaneous judgements 
rather than separate instructions. 
In conclusion, the use of simultaneous judgements has empirically been shown to 
produce the same qualitative dissociations as separate judgements within the process 
dissociation procedure (Jacoby, 1991). Because simultaneous judgements avoid 
limitations associated with using separate judgements and provides a direct opportunity 
to test underlying assumptions of independence, it can provide researchers with an 
additional tool with which to identify, separate and understand recollective and automatic 
influences of memory. 
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Appendix A: Instructions for Experiment 1 and 2. 
I. Instructions for the separate judgement groups. 
Study: A series of names are going to appear on the screen in front of you one at a time. 
As each name appears read it out loud. 
Test: Inclusion 
Assume that all of the names that you just read out loud were famous-names. I’m 
going to show you a not studied list of names some of which you have seen. As 
each name is presented indicate whether it is a famous name or a nonfamous 
name. So if you think that you saw the name before, call it famous, or if you 
know that it is famous indicate that it is famous. 
The names will appear in the center of the screen and will remain there until you 
make a response. At that time the computer will automatically present another 
name. The instructions will stay on the screen for the entire exercise. To call the 
name famous press the closed apple key and press the open apple key if it is not 
famous. 
Example: If Humprey Bogard was presented on the screen you would call him famous. 
If Sally Sue was presented, you would call her not famous. However, if you 
recalled that Sally Sue was on the study list then you would call her famous. 
Exclusion 
Now I’m going to show you another list of names. And I want you to do the 
same thing and indicate whether each name is famous or not famous. However, 
for this part of the study, assume that all of the names that you read were not 
famous. So if you think that you read the name during the first part of the 
experiment or you know that it is not famous, indicate not famous by pressing the 
open apple. Indicate famous when you know that the name is famous and you 
have not seen it on the study list. 
Example: Now, if Humprey Bogard was presented on the screen you would call him 
famous, unless you recognized him as being on the study list, then he would be 
not famous. If Sally Sue was presented, you would also call her not famous. 
II. Instructions for the simultaneous judgement groups. 
Study: A series of names are going to appear on the screen in front of you one at a time. 
As each name appears read it out loud. 
Test: Now I am going to show you another list of names. As each name appears on the 
screen I want you to indicate if the name is famous or not famous. I also want 
you to indicate whether the name was presented in the first list of names or not. 
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So to repeat indicate whether each name that appears is famous or not and 
whether it was presented during the first part of this experiment. 
The names will appear in the center of the screen and will remain there until you 
make a response. At that time the computer will automatically present another 
name. Press 1 when the name is famous and in the study list; press 2 when the 
name is famous but not in the study list, press 3 if the name is not famous but in 
the study list, or press 4 when the name is not famous and not in the study list. 
The instructions will stay on the screen for the entire exercise. 
Example: If Humprey Bogard came on the screen you would call him famous but not on 
the list. If Sally Sue was presented, you would call her not famous and not on the 
study list. 
III. Instructions for the divided attention task. 
After subjects were told to read the names off of the screen, those subjects assigned to 
the divided attention task were given the following instruction: 
While you are reading the name out loud, the computer is going to be calling out 
numbers. I want you to listen to the numbers and indicate to me when you hear 3 
odd numbers in a row. For example if you heard the numbers 2 4 5 9 7 you 
would indicate by raising your hand that you heard 3 odd numbers, namely 5 9 7 
in a row. Try to be as accurate as possible. Odd numbers in a row can include 
repeats, such as 3 1 1. Do you understand? If you miss two sequences in a row I 
will indicate this to you by saying “MISS”. To give you an idea of what you are 
looking for, there are 36 sequences in this task."^ Here is an example of how the 
numbers will sound. The computer will count from 1 to 9 and then backwards. 





























































































































































































































































Appendix D; Number Sequence used for the divided attention task in 































Mean SE Mean SE 
Exclusion 
Studied Nonstudied 
Mean SE Mean SE 
Full Attention 
Separate 203.73 20.04 208.00“ 22.07 204.75" 49.88 
Simultaneous 373.67 32.05 366.40 36.53 368.93 32.22 
Divided Attention 
Separate 206.20 17.92 228.14“ 21.21 203.60 30.16 









Note. n=15, except where indicated differently. 




Mean SE Mean SE 
Exclusion 
Studied Nonstudied 
Mean SE Mean SE 
Full Attention 
Separate 146.87 14.26 139.07 9.37 133.07 12.26 138.80 15.38 
Simultaneous 416.64“ 39.62 362.40 43.83 366.40 36.53 373.67 32.05 
Divided Attention 
Separate 144.53 14.55 160.87 13.00 126.47 10.13 153.60 17.09 
Simultaneous 335.29“ 43.55 288.80 20.70 338.27 22.03 322.60 23.13 
Note. n=15, except where indicated differently. 
“ n=14. 
Appendix F: ANOVA source table for reaction times as a function of 




Attention (A) 1 
Response Alternatives (B) 1 
AxB 1 





Within-subjects effects of Fame 










Within-subjects effects of Prior Occurence 










Within-subjects effects of Instruction 
















































Within-subjects effects of Fame (C) by Prior Occurrence (D) by Instruction (E) 
CxDxE 1 13.72** 
AxCxDxE 1 0.64 
BxCxDxE 1 1.13 
AxBxCxDxE 1 0.09 
Within-group Error 47 (1848.55) 
Note. Values encloses in parenthese represent mean square errors. *p<0.05. **/?<0.001. ***p<0.0001. 
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Mean SE Mean SE 
Exclusion 
Studied Nonstudied 
Mean SE Mean SE 
Note. n=15, except where indicated differently. 
“ n=16. ** n=12. n=13. ** n=14." n=10. 
Full Attention 
Separate 158.75 13.01 199.50'’ 23.04 279.54” 58.54 250.46“ 38.28 
Simultaneous* 313.07 22.32 341.13 30.43 313.60 23.12 300.60 26.80 
Divided Attention 
Separate 176.73 11.77 211.86*^ 18.60 240.53 26.33 236.00® 52.39 




Mean SE Mean SE 
Exclusion 
Studied Nonstudied 
Mean SE Mean SE 
Full Attention 
Separate 93.75 6.22 131.25 10.29 52.75 7.22 210.25 25.93 
Simultaneous'’ 293.14" 25.57 292.47 23.88 47.80 8.82 313.07 22.32 
Divided Attention 
Separate 96.93 7.40 119.40 9.23 58.67 7.56 198.53 17.04 
Simultaneous 374.17® 45.39 417.87 38.71 42.47 8.54 370.67 18.51 
Note. n=15, except where indicated differently. 
“n=14.*’n=16. "n=12. 
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Appendix H: ANOVA source table for reaction times as a fiinction of 
attention and response alternatives in Experiment 2. 
Source df 
Between-subjects effects 
Attention (A) 1 
Response Alternatives (B) 1 
AxB 1 





















Within-subjects effects of Prior Occurrence (D) 



























































Within-subjects effects of Fame (C) by Prior Occurrence (D) by Instruction (E) 
CxDxE 1 52.22*** 
AxCxDxE 1 0.51 
BxCxDxE 1 2.57 
AxBxCxDxE 1 0.00 
Within-group Error 41 (5671.39) 
Note. Values enclosed in parenthese represent mean square errors. *p<0.05. **p<0.0l. ***p<0.0001. 
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Footnotes 
^ Taken from Hayman & Tulving, 1989 
^ These factors were also entered into a 2x2x2x2x2 mixed ANOVA, which included 
examination of within-subject factors of prior occurance, instruction and fame. The 
source table is located in Appendix F. The results were not analyzed as no predictions 
were made about reaction times and the significant effects did not aid interpretation of 
the experimental results. 
^ These factors were also entered into a 2x2x2x2x2 mixed ANOVA, which included 
examination of within-subject factors of prior occurance, instruction and fame. The 
source table is located in Appendix H. The results were not analyzed as no predictions 
were made about reaction times and the significant effects did not aid interpretation of 
the experimental results. 
"^This instruction was given only to subjects in experiment 2, to try to increase their 
efficacy. 
^ Taken from Jennings and Jacoby (1993). 
^ Taken from Jennings and Jacoby (1993). 
^ Taken from Jennings and Jacoby (1993), 
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Table 1 The 4-Altemative Forced-choice Paradigm. 
Judged Famous (FA) Judged Not Famous 
Presented in the Study 
Phase 
Not Presented in the 
Study Phase 
Cell (A) 
The name is famous and 
in the study list 
Cell (C) 
The name is famous but 
not in the study list 
Cell (B) P(R) 
The name is not famous but 
in the study list 
Cell (D) 1-P(R) 
The name is not famous 
and not in the study list 
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Table 2 Mean probabilities of rating studied and nonstudied nonfamous- 
names as famous in Experiment 1. 
Test Condition 
Inclusion Exclusion 
Studied Nonstudied Studied Nonstudied 
Mean SE Mean SE Mean SE Mean SE 
Full Attention 
Separate Judgements .604 .040 .183 .034 .148 .031 .152 .051 
Simultaneous Judgements .687 .025 .209 .031 .082 .017 .069 .017 
Total .646 .024 .196 .023 .115 .018 .110 .028 
Divided Attention 
Separate Judgements .502 .031 .194 .042 .175 .028 .156 .025 
Simultaneous Judgements .588 .029 .242 .026 .100 .011 .057 .013 
Total .529 .021 .218 .025 .137 .016 .107 .017 
Overall Total ^588 ^018 5o7 l26 J012 JL09 ^ 
Table 3 Estimated mean probabilities of rating studied and nonstudied 
nonfamous-names as famous on the basis of recollective and automatic 






Separate Judgements .456 .052 
Simultaneous Judgements .605 .028 
Total .531 .032 
Divided Attention 
Separate Judgements .327 .035 
Simultaneous Judgements .456 .029 






































Overall Mean Total .462 .022 .098 .020 .204 .018 .114 .014 
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Table 4 Dependence between fame judgements and recollection as a 
fimction of attention for the simultaneous response procedure in Experiment 
1. 









0.605 0.156 0.074 
0.456 0.151 0.051 
0.531 0.154 0.063 
0.141 0.083 0.015 
0.184 0.069 0.012 
0.163 0.076 .014 
0.094 - 0.306 4.97* 
0.069 -0.283 2.19 
0.082 - 0.283 9.61** 
0.011 0.172 0.313 
0.013 -0.060 0.030 
0.012 0.056 0.004 
Note: Fa = famous; Rec = recollection observed; FaRec = famous and recollected, observed; 
Fa*Rec = expected famous and recollected when independent. 
*/?<0.05. **/?<0.01. 
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Table 5 Mean probabilities of rating studied and nonstudied Nonfamous- 
















































.135 .030 .129 .054 
.084 .023 .081 .018 
.110 .019 .105 .028 
Overall Total .576 .022 .161 .015 .090 .012 .092 .017 
Table 6 Estimated mean probabilities of rating studied and nonstudied 
Nonfamous-names as famous on the basis of recollective and automatic 













































.045 .111 .030 
.021 .047 .009 







Overall Mean Total .486 .024 .069 .019 ,171 .020 .091 .013 
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Table 7 Dependence between fame judgements and recollection as a 
function of attention for the simultaneous response procedure in Experiment 
2. 
Rec Fa FaRec Fa*Rec Yules Q % 
Studied Nonfamous-names 
Full Attention .585 .083 .053 .047 .170 .469 
Divided Attention .488 .156 .072 .078 -.097 .302 
Overall Mean .537 .120 .063 .059 .065 .203 
Nonstudied Nonfamous-names 
Full Attention .127 .047 .007 .007 .079 .036 
Divided Attention .139 .093 .012 .013 -.052 .024 
Overall Mean .133 .070 .010 .009 .027 .010 
Studied Famous-names 
Full Attention .743 .623 .502 .459 .435 9.88** 
Divided Attention .573 .758 .473 .433 .416 8.46** 
Overall Mean .658 .691 .488 .434 .482 27.03** 
Nonstudied Famous-names 
Full Attention .178 .525 .058 .095 -.477 9.04** 
Divided Attention .145 .698 .080 .098 -.314 2.97 
Overall Mean .162 .612 .069 .098 -.406 12.02** 
Note: Fa = famous; Rec = recollection observed; FaRec = famous and recollected, observed; 
Fa*Rec = expected famous and recollected when independent. 
*p<0.05. **J9<0.01 
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Table 8 Mean probabilities of rating studied and nonstudied Famous-Names 



























.746 .046 .260 
.645 .057 .121 
.695 .037 .191 
.031 .683 .036 
.019 .467 .072 



















Overall Total .894 .016 .734 .024 .268 .020 .614 .030 
Table 9 Estimated mean probabilities of correctly rating studied and 
nonstudied Famous-names as famous on the basis of recollective and 








Separate Judgements .681 
Simultaneous Judgements .743 
Total .712 
Divided Attention 
Separate Judgements . 5 04 
Simultaneous Judgements .573 
Total .539 



















.809 .034 .742 .041 
.496 .052 .541 .071 













Overall Mean Total .625 .023 ,120 .019 .716 .028 .687 .029 
93 
